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| The Dealignment of the Jackson Purchase |
Cale J. Sullivan
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The Dealignment of the Jackson Purchase
Cale J. Sullivan
Since the 1994 U.S. midterm elections, the Republican Party has made significant gains throughout the formerly Democratic “Solid South.” The pattern had mainly been limited to Southern states voting for the Republicans in federal elections and some statewide offices with Democrats still holding strong in elections for local offices and state legislature. With the fallacies of the GOP policy in Iraq, the War on Terror, and the Middle East becoming evident in the minds of Americans, many Democrats and analysts have begun to assume that the conservative surge in America has crested and has started to recede. Democrats captured three U.S. House seats in Indiana, another House seat in Kansas, and a Senate seat in Virginia (states that haven’t voted for a Democrat for President since 1964), and one House seat apiece in Texas and North Carolina (states that haven’t voted for a Democrat for President since 1976).
Here in Kentucky, Democrats retook one house seat and narrowly missed in two other races in 2006. With the 2007 state constitutional office elections over with and with Steve Beshear capturing landslides in Western Kentucky against indicted Governor Ernie Fletcher, many Democrats have begun to assume what will be the death-knell of Democratic politics in Kentucky: that the 2007 results mean the “Rock of Gibraltar” had its flirtation with GOP politics and the 2007 elections spell Western Kentucky returning to its historically Democratic roots. Local Democrats have reason to be proud of their work in 2007. Many county parties organized to defeat Governor Fletcher; McCracken County Democrats alone made almost 30,000 phone calls weeks before the election to voters in the First Congressional District, with volunteers from the West Kentucky Community and Technical College Democrats and other organizations helping to accomplish a 16% swing from the Republicans.
Republicans could very well argue that the 2007 results were voters (including a surprising number of Republicans) uniting against corruption in Frankfort to send Fletcher packing. Beshear was endorsed by former Republican Congressman and ’91 nominee for Governor Larry Hopkins and the son of the last Republican Governor prior to Fletcher and ’03 candidate for Governor, former State Rep. Steve Nunn. Some opinion polls prior to the election showed that half of Republicans who supported Anne Northup in her primary challenge to Fletcher had crossed party lines to support Steve Beshear.
In examining Congressional Districts to determine the likelihood of a challenger knocking off an incumbent, political guru Charlie Cook utilizes what has become known as the Cook Partisan Voter Index (PVI). The Cook PVI works by analyzing the votes from the previous Presidential election against the national vote. For example, if a Republican wins the national Presidential vote 51-49, while a congressional district voted 56-44 for the GOP, then the district would have a PVI of R+5. This means that in an election where the two candidates for Congress were effectively equal (in money, persona, etc.) the Republicans would take the seat by 5%. The PVI allows analysts to determine quantitatively how Republican and how Democratic certain areas are.
A close examination of the 2007 gubernatorial results in the First Congressional District against the 2003 results (utilizing Cook’s PVI) yields some surprising information for both Democrats and Republicans. For reference, Republican Fletcher beat Democratic Attorney General Ben Chandler in 2003 by 55%-45%, while Democrat Steve Beshear beat Governor Ernie Fletcher 58.7%-41.3%. Statewide, the Democrats enjoyed a 13.7% swing in votes.
COUNTY
(2007 Winner in Color) 2003 PVI 2007 PVI NET CHANGE IN PVI
ADAIR R+11.2 R+26.4 R+15.2
ALLEN R+10 R+11.2 R+1.2
BALLARD D+8.5 D+7.2 R+1.3
BUTLER R+16.1 R+14.7 D+1.4
CALDWELL D+0.4 D+6.1 D+5.7
CALLOWAY* D+1.3 R+2.6 R+3.9
CARLISLE D+4.6 D+1.9 R+2.7
CASEY R+20.2 R+27.7 R+7.5
CHRISTIAN R+0.1 R+7 R+6.9
CLINTON R+21.1 R+24.9 R+3.8
CRITTENDEN R+5.1 R+5.4 R+0.3
CUMBERLAND R+12.3 R+23.5 R+11.2
FULTON D+6.8 D+5.1 R+1.7
GRAVES D+3.4 D+2.5 R+0.9
HENDERSON D+7.9 D+8.2 D+0.3
HICKMAN D+4.5 R+0.2 R+4.7
HOPKINS** R+1.6 D+5.1 D+6.7
LIVINGSTON D+9 D+6.8 R+2.2
LOGAN D+2.6 R+3.2 R+5.8
LYON D+5 D+8.2 D+3.2
MARSHALL D+3 D+6 D+3
MCCRACKEN R+3.9 R+2.1 D+1.8
MCLEAN D+5.6 D+10.3 D+4.7
METCALFE R+0.2 R+2.1 R+1.9
MONROE R+25.2 R+24.9 D+0.3
MUHLENBERG D+12.4 D+15.3 D+2.9
RUSSELL R+15 R+19.1 R+4.1
SIMPSON D+1.5 R+1.8 R+3.3
TODD D+2.1 R+3.2 R+5.3
TRIGG R+0.9 R+4.9 R+4
UNION D+11.1 D+10.9 R+0.2
WEBSTER D+12.1 D+11.9 R+0.2
*Home County of Robbie Rudolph, Fletcher’s Running Mate
**Home County of Steve Beshear, Democratic Nominee for Governor
As the Cook PVI analysis of the 2007 election shows, six of the eight Purchase counties and 22 out of the 32 counties in the First District are still trending Republican despite Republican scandals in Washington and Frankfort, an unpopular war, two relatively unpopular GOP Senators in Kentucky, an unpopular President, and unpopular positions on key domestic issues (polling shows that Kentuckians care more about domestic issues such as health care and/or the economy than “foreign issues” such as Iraq).
However, the net PVI change disguises two facts that point favorably for the Democrats. Namely, voter turnout is suppressed in off-year elections anyways, and particularly in “off-off-year” elections such as those in Virginia, New Jersey, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Kentucky. That coupled with Beshear’s insurmountable lead in public polling may have led to many voters who were against Fletcher to stay home feeling that the outcome was not in doubt. Secondly, the Republican rise in Kentucky has been largely attributed to the use of “wedge issues” such as abortion, gun control, and civil rights to define Democrats as out-of-touch with the values of the people they represent.
Fletcher & Rudolph tried to make an issue out of Beshear’s enforcement of a Supreme Court ruling involving the Ten Commandments as Attorney General, and in the last hours of the campaign undertook a desperate array of steps to save the campaign, including moving the Ten Commandments into the state capitol and making “robo-calls” and statements referring to Steve Beshear & Daniel Mongiardo as “a couple of San Francisco treats.”
Steve Beshear’s campaign for the most part stayed silent on social issues and refused to get into the fray with Fletcher for good reason. The Beshear campaign’s message rested on change in Frankfort and providing new economic opportunities for Kentucky. Beshear had already defined the campaign as one being on issues of character and trust while Fletcher desperately tried to make the campaign about family values and expanded gaming.
The true impact of the 2007 race on the alignment of Purchase politics is none. The Purchase has dealigned itself politically. PVI analysis demonstrates that voters overall are just as likely to elect a Democrat as they are a Republican. The Purchase area is no longer a “Rock of Gibraltar” and is not a “Red Sea” that so many believe either.
Democrats can part the Red Sea and take back the Purchase simply by becoming better organized than their opposition. Democrats will gather in May in precinct conventions to elect precinct chairs. A simple method of organizing is to take that opportunity to utilize the 50-state strategy offered by DNC Chair and former Gov. Howard Dean. Instead of treating a precinct convention as a mind-numbing party bureaucratic exercise, use it as an opportunity to build an effective get-out-the-vote organization in each county.
Each precinct chair (or anyone else who attends the precinct convention for that matter) should take responsibility for 25 houses on their road or street. Knock on doors, introduce yourselves, and talk about who you are, why you’re a Democrat, ask which issues voters care about, and offer the Democratic position on those issues. According to the 50-state strategy, this should be done three times before the election, and don’t do it right before the election; make the first visit sometime in the summer (that way if a voter is completely opposed you have time to “replace” the house) and the last right before the election so that voters know who you are.
Make these voters an individual responsibility and look in on them from time to time. Make friends with the voters, you don’t have to strictly discuss politics. For example, if a voter gets sick, is hospitalized and you find out about it, look in on them. If their son is on the high school football or basketball team, ask them how their child is doing or how the team is going to look for the upcoming season. Each precinct chair (three in each precinct) making the rounds, showing that Democrats care about them as people could spell well over 4,000 votes in a county such as McCracken.
Democrats will also need to formulate new campaign strategies. Counting on the yellow-dogs to show up and vote straight ticket has recently been proven to be a losing strategy. Competitive general elections are here to stay for the next few decades at least. If Republicans try and hit Democrats on wedge issues, don’t lie down, take it and hope that voters will see through it and vote their pocketbook. Fight back.
For example, if a Republican wants to talk about abortion, point out that 7 out of the 9 justices that decided Roe v. Wade were appointed by Republican Presidents, almost 80% of all Supreme Court justices appointed since 1954 were appointed by Republicans, that abortions go up during GOP administrations, and go down during Democratic administrations, and that Republicans have had 35 years (including 2001-2007 when they had control of all three branches of government) to do something about it.
Ask a Republican incumbent why they haven’t proposed a bill to stop abortion. Perhaps suggest that Republicans are using dead fetuses as a morbid and disgusting political football to distract voters from the miserable Republican education, health, and economic policies.
Point out that Republicans care a lot about a baby while it’s in the womb, but don’t care about children (they love to cut education funding, S-CHIP, and other child-friendly programs) once they’re born, while Democrats care about a child from conception (Laci and Connor’s Law), after it’s born (S-CHIP on through to the Clean Water and Clean Air Act to education and college funding) and until old age (unemployment insurance and SSA). Hit back on gun control and any other issue as needed.
Youth targeting should also play a major role in long-term Democratic strategy. Trey Grayson, the Republican Secretary of State in Kentucky, was brought up through a “farm-system” that the Republicans set up in the early 1990s in Kentucky. Most campaign strategists will state that a campaign that depends on youth voters is a campaign that just lost, but Democrats either should view this as preparation for when youth voters do show up or take a look at Barack Obama’s campaign and see why this is necessary.
Republicans should simply reflect back on how they got to where they are now and should see where the problems lie. Try reading press releases pre-1994 midterm elections and move forward from there; the problems should be self-evident. When they lose more elections, maybe something will click.
Voters should be prepared for a decade-long battle for political control of the Purchase Region. The winner of this upcoming battle remains to be seen; the only thing assured is that the victor will be the party that works the hardest, recruits and contacts more voters, and recruits the more superior candidates for elected office.
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